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Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa: 




1. Executive Summary  
 
Maritime capacity building in the States of Somalia2 remains a relatively recent activity, with 
few initiatives dating back more than five or six years. In this time, it has undoubtedly had a 
positive impact in some areas. However, the success of these activities has been narrow and 
uneven. They have been able to strengthen pockets of capacity in specific organisations and 
institutions, but they have done so in a manner that has not always been well coordinated 
with other donor activities or local priorities, and in an environment of wider political, 
economic and institutional weaknesses that have constrained their impact and on which they 
have been dependent. Given the scale of the challenge, the transnational and regionally 
situated nature of the maritime problem space, and the timescales over which such activities 
have taken place, it is perhaps not surprising that they have struggled to be transformative in 
nature. Even so, the extent to which they have often taken place in the absence of local 
involvement at the levels of problem identification and project development and evaluation 
is also notable. This deficit has led to a ‘thin’ rather than ‘thick’ legitimacy amongst local 





1. Maritime insecurities are often linked closely to issues of insecurity and governance 
failure on land. Maritime capacity building activities must likewise grapple with these 
land-based issues as well as strictly maritime ones if it is to meet its objectives. 
2. Similarly, by their very nature, most maritime insecurities are regional and 
transnational in nature. National maritime capacity building processes need to be 
considered in relation to wider regional approaches.  
3. Capacity building is not well served by a top down, ‘cookie cutter’ approach that 
seeks to impose externally derived models of reform on diverse and complex local 
environments. Notions of best practice in capacity building can be important, but are 
                                                        
1 I am grateful to Filip Ejdus, of the University of Bristol, and the staff of Transparency Solutions, Hargeisa, 
for their assistance in preparing this paper, and to Andrew Saddleton, associate consultant to Aktis 
Strategy, for his helpful comments at the draft stage. The analysis and conclusions within remain the 
author’s own. Interviews for this paper were conducted by staff from Transparency Solutions (1–6); the 
author (7, 18); and Ejdus (8–17).  
2 Somalia remains a contested political entity. The term ‘States of Somalia’ is used here to refer to the 
entities of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the Republic of Somaliland and the Puntland State of Somalia.  
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best considered in terms of general principles rather than as a formulaic guide to 
action. 
4. Maritime capacity building is too expansive a concept to function as a good guide to 
policy in and of itself. Instead, it works best as a strategic framework through which 
specific activities can be planned and coordinated, drawing on appropriate 
professional and local expertise, and in ways that nested within wider good 
governance and development and security goals. 
5. Local context is key. Where possible external donors should engage meaningfully with 
local knowledge and interlocutors in determining the nature and scope of the 
challenge at hand. Local actors should be central to the planning, implementation and 
evaluation of projects. Donors should strive for ‘thick’ rather than ‘thin’ legitimacy in 
their programmes. Doing so will increase the likelihood that activities will be sustained 
once the donor leaves.  
6. There is a danger of local stakeholder fatigue with multiple, uncoordinated initiatives 
that do similar things in different ways, particularly planning strategies, short-term 
consultancies and workshops.  
7. ‘Hard’ capacity building, in the sense of equipment and infrastructure that will 
endure, is often valued highly. However, such activities need to be accompanied by 
support and training for maintenance and upkeep if they are to be effective. 
Equipment provided should be suitable to the environment, operating parameters 
and technical skills of local actors.  
8. The ambition of donor programmes should be tailored to the resources available to 
support them. There is a danger that grand claims to transformation will founder in 
the face of local challenges and insufficient donor funding to meet them. Donor 
credibility and legitimacy can be undermined if this happens.  
9. Beware the blanket term ‘political will’. Apparent absences of ‘political will’ generally 
mask real problems of politics, which should be understood and addressed on their 
own terms. 
10. There will be winners and losers in any process of reform. Programmes should 
consider how losers could be incentivised and motivated to engage in the process of 
reform, or at least not to disrupt it. They should consider ways in which the range of 
winners can be broadened. Stakeholder analysis of this sort should be factored into 








Maritime capacity building has emerged as an important component of peacebuilding, 
conflict prevention and development activities in the Western Indian Ocean region in recent 
years. The immediate driver for these initiatives was the proliferation of Somali piracy in the 
region from around 2005. However, they have also taken place in the context of conflict and 
instability in Somalia, including the fragmentation of the Somali state and an ongoing struggle 
against the Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabaab.  
 
Maritime capacity building is one of the key strategies through which international actors 
have attempted to mitigate the insecurities of the region. These include international 
organisations such as the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) the United Nations (UN), and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO); individual nations including the US, UK, UAE, and Turkey amongst others; 
non-governmental and non-profit organisations such as Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP); and 
private security actors such as Aktis Strategy and Bancroft Global Development.3  
 
Such a diverse range of actors exhibits a similarly diverse range of motivations for engaging 
in capacity building. These broadly consist of three inter-linked categories of justification.4 
The first of these relates to addressing maritime security concerns, in the sense of threats and 
risks that emanate from or are facilitated by the maritime environment, including piracy and 
terrorism. The second concerns the capacity to exploit the economic opportunities offered 
by the sea, both for the littoral states themselves and for external actors and interests: what 
is often called the blue growth agenda. Finally, there are a series of what might best be 
characterised as human security justifications, including fisheries protection and 
sustainability for coastal communities, the safety of lives at sea, and the need to manage the 
negative impacts of climate change or marine pollution.  
 
 
4. The concept of capacity building 
 
Capacity building in the maritime arena incorporates a wide range of activities and initiatives 
aimed at assisting littoral states to develop effective local mechanisms for managing these 
maritime threats, risks, and exploiting the opportunities presented by marine resources. The 
EU NAVFOR anti-piracy mission in the region, for example, understands capacity building as 
consisting of: 
 
…activities which are directed at the empowerment of governments and coastal communities 
to efficiently and efficaciously govern and sustainably exploit the maritime domain, including 
territorial waters and exclusive economic zones (EU NAVFOR 2015: 1, emphasis in original)5 
 
                                                        
3 See Annex 1 for further details.  
4 For selected articulations of these themes see: AU 2012: 7-11; CoEU 2014a: 6–8, 14; HM Govt. 2014: 19; 
US Govt. 2005: 3–6. See also Edmunds 2014: 1–3.  
5 The EU NAVFOR definition is drawn directly from Bueger 2014: 4.  
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Such a conceptualisation is exceptionally broad in scope. Potentially at least, it comprises a 
wide range of issues and actors in the maritime arena, from infrastructure development in 
port areas and beyond, to the rule of law and justice sector reform, administrative reform in 
local and national governance structures, and security sector reform amongst coastguard and 
naval forces.  
 
In practice, those organisations engaged in maritime capacity building have focused on 
discrete areas of this wider agenda. Thus for example, EUCAP Somalia (formerly and until 
March 2017 known as EUCAP Nestor), the EU’s capacity building mission in the Western 
Indian Ocean, focuses specifically on strengthening the security capacity of states in the 
region in order that they can better fight piracy, as well as to effectively manage and protect 
their territorial waters and maritime resources (CoEU 2012: Arts. 2, 3). The EU’s Programme 
to Promote Regional Maritime Security in the Eastern and Southern Africa-Indian Ocean 
Region (MASE) aims to support police, court and prison staff in littoral states in the arrest and 
prosecution of pirates (OBP 2016a). Similarly, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has, 
amongst other activities, focused on Somali maritime law enforcement capacities, including 
the criminal justice mechanisms for the prosecution and imprisonment of pirates (UNODC 
2016). For its part, the IMO has conducted various activities under its Djibouti Code of 
Conduct initiative, aimed at strengthening coastguard capacities and maritime legal 
regulation in Somalia and Somaliland (IMO 2015: 7). The FAO works with the Somalia Ministry 
of Fisheries to strengthen its governance and resource management structures (FAO 2017). 
 
These initiatives manifest in practice into three main categories of capacity building activity. 
The first of these concerns issues of strategic planning and governance in the maritime arena. 
Thus, for example, international organisations and actors played a key role in supporting and 
encouraging the Somali government to produce a Somali Maritime Resource and Security 
Strategy in September 2013 (Federal Republic of Somalia 2013: 3).6  The purpose of the 
strategy is to provide a coherent framework for policy in the maritime arena, identifying 
Somalia’s key goals and priorities in this area, as well as the risks and threats it faces and the 
actions it needs to take in order to meet these challenges. Other activities include assistance 
by organisations including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and EUCAP 
Somalia amongst others on drafting new legislation for maritime governance, such as the new 
Coastguard Bill for the Somaliland region.7 Similarly, the United Nations Assistance Mission 
to Somalia’s (UNSOM) Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group (ROLSIG) has provided 
assistance to the Somali government on the harmonisation of their maritime code with 
international law (UNSOM 2016). External actors have also provided expert advisors to Somali 
policy-makers, to assist them in the development and implementation of maritime policy 
initiatives. The aim in all cases is to encourage good governance practices in the maritime 
arena, in the sense of local policy making that takes place in a transparent and accountable 
manner, incorporating a respect for human rights and democratic principles, and according 
to rationalist models of organisational planning.  
 
                                                        
6 In terms of international organisations, these are: CBCG, CGPCS, EEAS, EU Commission, EU NAVFOR, 
EUCAP Somalia, FAO, IGAD, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, OBP, UN, UNDP, UNODC, UNPOS, UNSOM. In terms 
of states, these are: Australia, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles, Turkey, UK and USA. 
7 At the time of writing, the Coastguard Bill had been awaiting approval by the parliament of Somaliland 
for over a year.  
  EU-CIVCAP Working Paper No. 01–17, May 2017 
 5 
The second category of activities concerns the direct provision of training, equipment and 
support to local actors, particularly in the maritime security sector, including the judiciary and 
penal system. EUCAP Somalia, the IMO and UNODC all provide various courses and training 
sessions for the Somali and Somaliland coastguards, focusing on skills provision in areas such 
as swimming, boat handling, marine repair and maintenance, search and rescue, and 
maritime law.8 The UK has provided training to the Somaliland Attorney General on Serious 
Crimes, in areas including forensics, crowd control and intelligence, and has also contracted 
training for Somalia coastguards to the private company, Aktis Strategy, and in Somaliland to 
a joint venture between Aktis and Axiom International.9 The IMO, under the auspices of its 
Djibouti Code of Conduct, has established a Regional Training Centre in Djibouti to provide 
maritime education and training to local actors from across the region. The Centre was funded 
by Japan, with equipment provided by Denmark and the Republic of Korea (CGPCS 2015).  
 
As well as training, international donors have provided equipment and support directly to 
maritime organisations and institutions. EUCAP Somalia has provided equipment to the 
Somaliland maritime authorities.10 The IMO too has donated speedboats to the Somaliland 
coastguard, as has the UNDP.11 UNODC provides technicians on the ground in the Port of 
Berbera to repair and maintain the boats of the local coastguard, as well as two (Finnish) 
police investigators to the port of Garowe and support to the port police in Bosaso, both in 
Puntland. The UK government, through Aktis/Axiom, have assisted in the development of 
staff records, HR systems and IT skills for the Somaliland coastguard, as well as in the provision 
of communications equipment and vehicles. 12  In all cases, these ‘train and equip’ 
programmes provide direct skills and material support to those local organisations charged 
with the management of maritime territorial spaces and resources.  
 
Finally, there are a range of initiatives by various actors aimed at strengthening local 
infrastructure, again, with a particular focus on the security sector, judicial and penal system. 
The UK for example committed GBP 14.3 million in 2013 under its Conflict, Security and 
Stabilisation Fund (CSSF) to support policing and justice in Somalia, including a GBP 1.5 million 
project aimed at rebuilding Mogadishu’s prison to increase capacity and meet international 
standards and the building of a new Coastguard Headquarters in Somaliland, as well as the 
refurbishment of a coastguard base at Zaylac amongst other activities (DFID 2013: 14; HMG 
2013).13 The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), funded by the governments 
of Demark, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands and the UK, was involved in the construction of 
a new 500-bed prison in the Puntland region of the country with the aim of providing secure, 
humane and locally-based facilities in which convicted pirates can be incarcerated (UNOPS 
2016). UNODC, with EUCAP Somalia and OBP, have worked to develop a Maritime Operations 
Centre for the Somaliland coastguard in the port of Berbera (OBP 2016b).  
 
                                                        
8 Interview 11, Hargeisa, 27 November 2016.  
9 Interview 7, Skype, 28 November 2016.  
10 Interview 12, Hargeisa, 27 November 2016.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Interviews 7 and 18, Skype, 28 November 2016 and 2 March 2017.  
13 As has been the case with with training and equipment, the UK government’s capacity building has 
been delivered through private sector actors, including Aktis/Axiom and Adam Smith International, under 
the CSSF. 
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Such activities share a number of characteristics. First, and for the most part, they have been 
driven primarily and at least initially by the problem of piracy in the Western Indian Ocean 
region. Secondly, and for related reasons, they have centred on the three political entities 
comprising Somalia: Somalia itself, Somaliland, and Puntland. Finally, they have tended to 
concern issues of security and security sector reform (SSR), in the sense that they have 
focused on the strengthening of local maritime security actors – particularly coastguards and 




4.1 The rationale of local capacity building 
 
The link between maritime capacity building and peacebuilding and conflict prevention 
comprises external (donor) driven and internal (local) interests that are, at least in principle, 
considered to be mutually reinforcing and mutually beneficial. Such activities take place on 
the assumption that developing local states’ capacities to manage and police the insecurities 
present in and often emanating from their own regions will in turn contribute to the security 
of the donors themselves. There is also a common view that doing so will also help strengthen 
the security, peacebuilding and development prospects of the recipient states themselves. 
For example, the EU strategic framework on security sector reform states that:  
 
Insecurity and instability are frequently generated or exacerbated by a lack of effective and 
accountability security systems. Helping partner countries to reform their security systems 
supports the EU’s objectives of peace and stability, inclusive and sustainable development, 
state-building and democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international 
law (EC 2016: 2). 
 
The EU Maritime Security Strategy echoes these rationales, stating:  
 
Several factors, such as illegal activities of non-state actors, cross border crime, international 
terrorism or piracy, exploit the weaknesses of fragmented local, regional and global 
governance systems. Using all EU instruments within the comprehensive approach enables 
the EU to effectively address maritime security threats at and from sea, tackle the root causes 
and restore good governance (CoEU 2014b: 9).  
 
Similar rationales are visible amongst other key maritime capacity-building donors too.14 In 
these cases, maritime capacity building takes place on the assumption of a positive and 
reciprocal relationship between peace, democracy, development and security (CoEU 2015: 
2–3). It is concerned not just with the strengthening of specific capacities in a purely 
operational sense, but also with normative questions about how such capacities should best 
be employed, managed and governed against a wider framework of democratic governance, 
state-building and reform. In conception and potential therefore, maritime capacity building 
is both highly ambitious and deeply normative, albeit in a manner that is nested within wider 
processes of reform and intervention on the part of both the donor community and the local 
state concerned.  
 
                                                        
14 See for example OBP 2016a; UK Govt. 2014; US Dept. of State 2010: 1. 
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4.2 Whose capacity? 
 
While this agenda is often presented, at least implicitly, as being to the mutual benefit of both 
donors and recipients, it can also be in tension with the priorities, practices and interests of 
the local actors concerned. At a minimum, there may be a fundamental difference in problem 
definition, or at least prioritisation, between local and international actors.  
 
There have been two main drivers for maritime capacity building in the region. The first of 
these was the emergence of maritime terrorism as a significant concern, following the 
bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000, and the MV Limburg in October 2002. The second, 
and more recently dominant driver has been the problem of piracy in the Western Indian 
Ocean. The concern with piracy particularly has persisted and endured since the decline of 
endemic pirate activity in the region in 2013.15 Such concerns are unsurprising given the 
disruptive impact of Somali piracy on global commerce, which is estimated to have incurred 
an additional USD 5.7–6.1 billion cost to the shipping industry in 2012 alone (OBP 2012: 2). 
Even so, local actors sometimes articulate a rather different set of priorities in relation to both 
the maritime arena and to national security more widely. In Somalia at least, the latter 
remains dominated by the Al-Shabaab insurgency in the south of the country and the ongoing 
political fragmentation of the Somali state. In contrast, the specific problem of piracy can 
often seem a relatively low priority for local actors, or even an unfair obsession by the 
international community. This is particularly the case given that many Somalis view piracy as 
a legitimate defensive response on the part of impoverished and disempowered coastal 
communities to rampant Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and the dumping 
of hazardous waste by international actors (Samatar et al. 2010: 1384–1387).   
 
Local actors have tended to attach more importance to those aspects of the maritime capacity 
building agenda associated with blue growth and human security. For example, anti-piracy 
activities are barely mentioned in Somaliland’s key Five Year National Plan for 2012–16. 
Maritime capacity building is framed primarily in relation to issues of fisheries protection and 
the development of facilities and infrastructure at the Port of Berbera (RoS 2011: 76–81, 130–
134). The Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy of 2014 evidences an even greater 
emphasis on marine resource protection and exploitation. Piracy is only mentioned once, and 
even then, as a subordinate issue to maritime crime, and as a problem that has reduced (RoS 
2013: 6). Instead, the most important maritime security risks and threats are identified as IUU 
fishing and illegal maritime dumping of waste, alongside ‘transnational terrorist groups, 
narcotics and human trafficking smugglers and transnational criminals’ (RoS 2013: 8). Priority 
is also placed on a lack of maritime skills capacity and experience in Somali civil society, in 
relation to fishing communities and so on (RoS 2013: 8). A similar balance of emphasis can be 
seen in the AU’s Integrated Maritime Strategy for 2050, which, though it recognises a series 
of maritime security challenges including piracy, remains focused largely on blue growth 
issues (AU 2012). 
 
There are also potential tensions between the normative aspects of the international capacity 
building agenda on the one side, and local preferences and practices on the other. There are 
two aspects of friction in this respect. The first concerns the explicitly political normativities 
                                                        
15 See for example CoEU 2012: Art. 1; IMO 2015: 2; OBP 2016a; UNODC 2016.  
  EU-CIVCAP Working Paper No. 01–17, May 2017 
 8 
associated with key international actors’ commitments to principles of democratic politics 
and good governance in their capacity building activities. Thus, for example, while states in 
the region, including both Somalia and Somaliland, are nascent democracies, they continue 
to face considerable challenges in consolidating and institutionalising democratic politics, 
which extend beyond the narrow problem space of the maritime arena alone. In this respect, 
the democratic and good governance aspects of the maritime capacity building agenda are 
dependent on, conditioned by and mediated through a wider process of political practice and 
development, over which international donors may have little influence (Edmunds 2014: 8–
9).  
 
Secondly, capacity building is also normative in that it tends to be premised on rationalist 
principles of organisational effectiveness, efficiency and planning. Such approaches may 
appear unproblematic and neutral. However, they can often be in tension with established 
local practices and ways of doing things, which may derive from informal, personalised and 
pragmatic approaches to problem solving (Bueger 2014: 21). Such tensions are particularly 
pronounced where formal institutions and practices of governance have been undermined 
by decades of civil war and state collapse. The danger here is that the prescriptions of the 
international capacity building agenda are so at odds with existing practices of governance 
that they become irrelevant to local circumstances, counterproductive, or undermined to 
such a degree that they become fundamentally comprised in practice (Edmunds 2014: 9). The 
manifestations of these tensions are explored in further detail in the second part of this paper. 
 
 
4.3 Alternative approaches 
 
The discussion so far has focused on initiatives from major international organisations and 
Western states. These have been conditioned by the rationales and normativities identified 
above, and might best be described as representing a liberal model of maritime capacity 
building. However, there are at least two other significant actors in the region who have taken 
a markedly different approach: Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Turkey has 
invested heavily in commercial and security infrastructure, including a major renovation of 
the Port of Mogadishu under the auspices of the Albayrak Group, as well as other projects 
such as road building (Ozkan and Orakci 2015). The UAE-based company DP World has been 
granted a 30-year concession to run and develop the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, reportedly 
based on potential investment plans of USD 442 million (Gulf News 2016), including plans to 
build a military base on a 25-year lease (VOA 2017). The UAE has also donated boats to the 
Somaliland Coastguard and provided financial support to the Puntland Maritime Police Force 
(PMPF), with whom the EU does not officially work due to its controversial human rights 
record.16 The Turkish and UAE initiatives depart from the liberal model in that they do not 
include commitments to governance reform or the other normativities discussed above. Nor 
have they been coordinated through the UN. Instead, they have taken place primarily for 
reasons of commercial, strategic or other national interest, and in the context of significant 
contractual, financial and political opacity (Gullo 2012; Hurriyet 2014). In this respect they 
offer an alternative, and in some ways oppositional and even competing, approach to the 
liberal model that is promoted by Western actors and many international organisations.  
                                                        
16 Interview 12, Skype, 27 November 2016.  
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5. Local capacity building in practice: the record so far 
 
The picture of maritime capacity building activity in the region, and particularly in Somalia, is 
complex and multifaceted. The donor sector includes a wide range of different international 
actors and organisations, and of different divisions and agencies within them. The local level 
too exhibits a significant degree of complexity. In this context, and despite the various efforts 
and resources that have been devoted to it, maritime capacity building has not been a 
straightforward or unproblematic activity. The following section explores these tensions 





Assessing the effectiveness of maritime capacity building programmes in the region is 
complicated by several considerations. The maritime arena is only one, comparatively 
narrow, component of a much wider series of processes of political change, peacebuilding 
and state reformation across the entire region. Despite the sometimes rather grand ambitions 
and rationales implied by its link to governance reform and security building, maritime 
capacity building cannot function as the driver of these wider changes in and of itself, and, in 
many ways, is dependent upon them for its success.  
 
Such tensions point to a wider and ongoing dilemma faced by all such initiatives, at least in 
their liberal guise. Maritime capacity building is, in conception, holistic. It comprises all 
elements of the maritime sector – from fisheries, to coastguards to port police and 
infrastructure, and it addresses not only the operational capacities of organisations, but also 
the wider administrative, governance and judicial systems in which they sit and on which they 
are dependent. The rationale for what the EU calls this ‘Comprehensive Approach’ (CoEU 
2015: 9) appears sound: an effective police force or coastguard will only be of limited utility 
if the suspects they arrest cannot be processed and tried by an ineffective judicial system, or 
if their staff are not paid due to a dysfunctional human resource management system in the 
Ministry in charge of their salaries. 
 
However, the very ambition of this holistic agenda means that it has been difficult to 
implement in practice, particularly given the relative complexity and diversity of the problem 
space. Indeed, one of the most common criticisms of such projects is that there has been a 
lack of effective coordination in the conception, planning and implementation of individual 
initiatives, leading to duplication, redundancy and occasional irrelevance. As such, capacity 
building initiatives have tended to manifest as discreet, technically separate activities, rather 
than as part of a strategically coherent, coordinated endeavour. One obvious reason for this 
weakness concerns the sheer number of donors involved. The Somali Maritime Resource and 
Security Strategy of 2013, for example, acknowledges the assistance of 17 international 
organisations and eight bilateral donors in its preamble; all this for a 12-page document of 
only 3,690 words (see Federal Republic of Somalia 2013: 3). This lack of coordination can lead 
to frustration amongst local stakeholders. An official in the Somaliland Ministry of Interior 
noted in 2016 that the ‘key challenge’ faced in implementing programmes has been overlap 
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between them and lack of coordination between donors. 17  Similarly, an official in the 
Somaliland Coastguard observed that there was little coordination between donors, and 
significant overlap between programmes. 18  Such challenges can sometimes be a 
consequence of a basic lack of capacity on the part of the local actors themselves, who can 
struggle to coordinate between donors in an environment of financial and human resource 
constraint. They can also reflect the difficulties of transplanting what may be successful 
coordination between donors at the local operational level to the higher level of strategic 
planning in what are often large and bureaucratic international organisations or state 
actors.19  
 
Several organisations have been established to improve coordination between donors to the 
region. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), for example, was 
created in 2008 precisely to better coordinate international actions in the fight against piracy 
in the Western Indian Ocean, with some success (OBP 2016c). Similarly, OBP acts as a clearing-
house for information on maritime capacity building and other anti-piracy initiatives in the 
region. However, the impact of these initiatives on the ground has been limited. For example, 
the Capacity Building Coordination Group of the CGPCS attempted to establish an online 
Capacity Building Coordination Platform though which donors could catalogue and share 
information on projects. However, this has foundered for lack of user engagement and a 
reluctance to share information that could be politically or commercially sensitive. The 
Maritime Security Coordination Committee (MSCC) is a forum for information sharing, 
optimisation and coordination of maritime security capacity building programmes. Although 
it is formally supposed to bring together all Somali authorities as well as international donors, 
Somaliland authorities have been reluctant to take part due to its whole Somalia remit.20 
 
Perhaps a deeper problem underpinning complaints about overlap and duplication amongst 
activities is a lack of strategic coherence amongst donors about what maritime capacity 
building is attempting to achieve, and how it is to go about doing so. At a minimum, each 
donor has their own goals and mission parameters, and each is responsible to its own 
mandate or contract rather than to the entire project of international capacity building. There 
are also tensions between the transformative ambitions of the agenda as a whole, and the 
specific praxis of what can be accomplished with available resources, within the timescales of 
the projects concerned, and in the context of the requirements specific to the organisation 
or sector whose capacity is being built.  
 
In consequence, many initiatives have been relatively limited in scale and specific in scope. 
EUCAP Somalia for example has provided the Somaliland coastguard with ten computers, five 
cars, 30 radios and one inflatable boat, amongst other sundries, as part of its equipment 
donation programme.21 Such donations are helpful in their own terms, particularly given the 
low base of capacity that local actors are often working from. However, they fall short of 
providing the level of capability that is required if it is to function effectively as envisaged. As 
one EUCAP Somalia official put it: ‘mentoring, monitoring and advising is a multiplication 
                                                        
17 Interview 3, Hargeisa, 20 August 2016. 
18 Interview 1, Hargeisa, 21 August 2016.  
19 Interview 18, Skype, 2 March 2017. 
20 Interview 11, Hargeisa, 27 November 2016.  
21 Interview 9, Hargeisa, 18 November 2016.  
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factor of what’s already there. When you have nothing in place, you multiply zero by zero. 
And you can multiply from here to infinity, it will always be zero’.22 The feeling that the 
current training programmes are insufficient in the absence of hard capabilities is universally 
shared among the local stakeholders as well. In the words of an official from the Somaliland’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘if you train people and the resources are not there, it’s useless. 
After the training, people return to empty offices and to projects that have to be implemented 
in which the resources are not there’.23 
 
Even then, there may underlying skills deficits amongst local actors that prevent them from 
making good use of the equipment they do have, or maintaining it so it will continue to be of 
use. One key donor has noted that the first few months of their training programmes (in 
Somaliland and wider Somalia) are often focused on inculcating basic skills amongst students, 
such as learning how to swim.24 Another noted that the equipment provision served little 
substantive purpose if recipients lacked the necessary wherewithal and skills to look after it 
properly once it was in their possession.25 Some locals also complained that some of the 
training with which they are provided is partial and demonstrates a lack of trust. For example, 
while a range of different donors are active in teaching boat-handling skills and so on to local 
coastguards, certain essential skills – for example, opposed boarding techniques – are not 
provided by some donors because of a lingering suspicion about their potential use in piracy 
activities.26  
 
Donor programmes have thus been limited by the sheer scale of the challenge presented by 
the local environment, where acute shortages of skills, equipment and resources are the 
norm. This is how one insider described a meeting during which an EUCAP Somalia official 
suggested a new command structure for the Somaliland coastguard leadership: ‘The locals 
were only listening; they didn’t ask a single question. Most of them had an extremely poor 
command of English […]. They didn’t really get what was said. Finally, they promised that they 
will take a look at this and they never implemented the structure’.27 Any assessment of the 
effectiveness of international maritime capacity building activities thus needs to be set in 
context. In particular, they have simply not yet taken place on the scale – nor over time 
timescales necessary – to inculcate transformative change in what are often still very weak 
states that are attempting to build these capacities from scratch. Where they have had an 
impact, this has been limited to the specific cohort or project concerned, in a piecemeal 
fashion, rather than across the sector as a whole.  
 
For their part, local actors recognise these challenges, and at one level appear to value all the 
help they can get. In interviews, respondents were cautiously positive about these 
programmes on their own terms, noting for example that: ‘The help we receive from donors 
is our lifeline’,28 and that ‘our capability is slowly growing’.29 One respondent estimated that 
                                                        
22 Interview 8, Skype, 18 November 2016.  
23 Interview 16, Hargeisa, 29 November 2016.  
24 Interview 7, Skype, 28 November 2016.  
25 Interview 18, Skype, 2 March 2017.  
26 Interview 17, Hargeisa, 2 December 2016.  
27 Interview 15, Hargeisa, 28 November 2016.  
28 Interview 2, Hargeisa, 21 August 2016. 
29 Interview 1, Hargeisa, 21 August 2016.   
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‘around 40 per cent’ of programmes were effective,30 while another suggested that there had 
been some successes, although there would have been more with better coordination and a 
focus on local needs.31 Set against these relatively positive views, there was also a common 
feeling across all respondents that donor programmes were insufficiently ambitious to meet 
the scale of the challenge faced on the ground, especially in the face of the wider economic 
and governance challenges of the region as a whole.32 More specifically, there was a lack of 
patience amongst locals with donor initiatives that did not result in concrete outcomes. In 
particular, this impatience was directed toward what were seen as multiple and often 
duplicated exercises in strategic planning and assessment, and – again multiple and often 
duplicated – workshops, meetings and conferences.33 In contrast, those initiatives that were 
most valued were those that delivered capacities that would remain in place once the donors 





The local preference for concrete outcomes that will endure is indicative of wider concerns 
around the sustainability of projects. There are two elements of vulnerability in this respect. 
The first concerns the sometimes-finite nature of donor projects, budgets and personnel 
appointments. Such initiatives are often self-contained, in the sense that they are conceived 
and implemented based on producing a specific deliverable, whether that is the delivery of 
strategic advice, a training programme or equipment donation. Even if these activities are 
successful on their own terms, they may founder over time if they are not sustained by 
appropriate follow-on support, or if they create isolated islands of capacity in otherwise 
unreformed organisations.  
 
Second, wider structural impediments may blunt the impact of individual projects. Specific 
successes in training personnel will only have a limited influence if those same personnel are 
not then employed in the positions for which they have been trained, for reasons of 
organisational politics or even simply a lack of communication, awareness, and understanding 
in the institution concerned. Such problems have been apparent in Somalia, where 
appointments to positions of responsibility within organisations such as the coastguard are 
often determined by clan politics or informal power-sharing agreements rather than technical 
expertise or relevant qualifications.34  Another problem is the absence of experts in civil 
service and centralisation of decision making in the hands of politically appointed ministers. 
As one EUCAP Somalia official explained: 
 
There is no middle in their bureaucracy. In my home country you engage civil servants because 
with politicians you don’t have the continuity. They are in positions now but they might not 
be there after the next elections. In Somalia you don’t have that. All the people that you work 
now might disappear after the next elections.35 
                                                        
30 Interview 3, Hargeisa, 20 August 2016.  
31 Interview 1, Hargeisa, 21 August 2016. 
32 Interviews 2, 3, 4 and 5, Hargeisa, 18, 20 and 21 August 2016.   
33 Interview 10, Hargeisa, 27 November 2016.  
34 Interview 1, Skype, 28 November 2016.  
35 Interview 7, Skype, 18 November 2016.  
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These difficulties are indicative of the wider tension, discussed above, between the donors’ 
often holistic ambitions for reform, local circumstance, and the narrow, specialist or 
organisationally specific demands of the capacity building agenda in practice. They also 
illustrate the pitfalls of assuming that individual reforms will be sustained by formalised 
principles of organisational effectiveness, in societies that may operate in very different ways 
in practice.  
 
 
5.3 Local ownership 
 
Underpinning many of these problems of effectiveness and sustainability is the question of 
‘local ownership’; that is the extent to which the demands of the maritime capacity building 
agenda are accepted and internalised by the institutions and political communities in which 
they take place. Almost all donors recognise the importance of local ownership in capacity 
building projects, at least rhetorically. Thus, for example, the EU’s strategic framework for 
supporting security sector reform emphasises ‘the participation of all stakeholders’ and the 
importance of ‘inclusive consultation processes’ as baseline principles for its SSR initiatives. 
The same document notes that to be ‘applicable and effective’, programmes should be 
‘developed on the basis of nationally owned processes’, and that ‘[r]eform efforts will be 
effective and sustainable only if they are rooted in a country’s institutions… owned by 
national security and justice actors, and considered legitimate by society as a whole’ (EC 2016: 
5, 7). The Council of the European Union’s Conclusions on the Horn of Africa document is 
clear that ‘[t]he effectiveness of [our] support is… dependent on local ownership and the 
political commitment of the countries in the region’ (CoEU 2011: 2). The US government’s 
framework for Maritime Security Sector Reform also stresses the importance of local context 
for example (US Govt. 2010: 13) while the UK’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy notes the 
importance of ‘effective local politics and strong mechanisms which weave people into the 
fabric of decision making’ (HM Govt. 2014b: 12). 
 
Despite these multiple commitments however, the reality of local ownership is often more 
questionable. Certainly, Somali respondents were nearly unanimous in their view that 
capacity building projects were driven by donors, with little involvement of local actors in 
either the planning or the assessment of projects.36 Respondents noted for example that, 
while ‘local involvement in the planning process’ was a ‘key element’ for the success of 
programmes 37 , there was a ‘lack of communication between locals and external 
stakeholders’38 and ‘the impact is not felt, because everything is top down’.39 In general, the 
picture is one of local actors who engage with external programmes, with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm, but who feel left out of the processes through which these activities are 
conceived, developed and evaluated.  
 
The reasons for the disconnect between local actors and programmes are multiple, and 
mirror similar experiences with similar initiatives in other post-conflict environments, and on 
                                                        
36 Interviews 2, 3, 5 and 6, Hargeisa, 18, 20 and 21 August 2016. 
37 Interview 2, Hargeisa, 21 August 2016. 
38 Interview 4, Hargeisa, 20 August 2016.  
39 Interview 1, Hargeisa, 21 August 2016. 
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land as well as at sea (Edmunds 2014: 9–10). One of the most important of these concerns 
the difficulties international actors face when attempting to develop close relationships with 
local actors and gain local country knowledge, especially when donor postings and projects 
may only be short term in nature. This is particularly the case in environments where local 
power structures and ways of doing things may be informal and take place parallel to, rather 
than within, formal institutional structures and procedures. In the words of a local expert, 
‘One of the biggest weaknesses of [international donors] is that they don’t understand the 
local context, the dynamics of the institutions that they work in’.40 Under such circumstances, 
building a knowledge of local needs and practices – and even of the key stakeholders for any 
given project – can be difficult to accomplish on a short timescale. As explained by an official 
of the Attorney-General Office of Somaliland: ‘Most of the EUCAP Nestor [now EUCAP 
Somalia] staff are not local. They don’t hire local staff. By the time they get certain degree of 
understanding the local context, they leave the mission’.41 Certainly, local respondents in 
Somalia bemoaned an apparent lack of local knowledge amongst donors, noting that they ‘do 
not know much about this country’ and that they ‘do not value local knowledge’.42 Even the 
role of diaspora Somalis as interlocutors was criticised on the basis that they had been out of 
the country for too long to really understand local circumstances, needs and structures.43  
 
Such difficulties can be compounded by what are often chronic absences of human and 
resource capacity at a local level, creating a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma for many donor 
programmes. Even a local needs assessment requires some specialist knowledge in order to 
identify what capacities need to be strengthened and why. However, in the Somali case, 
decades of war and state weakness – and indeed the very fact that so many institutions are 
being built from scratch – means that local actors are often dependent on donors to provide 
the very competencies that are necessary for local ownership to be meaningful.44 Similarly, a 
lack of financial resources can create a dependency of local actors on donor contributions 
simply in order to function, let alone assert ownership over a programme or initiative. In 
essence, locals may know that they should be coordinating activities, but simply lack the 
capacity to do so. Indeed, an official in the Somaliland Coastguard was blunt in his assessment 
that there could be no meaningful local ownership in the face of a fundamental lack of 
resources at the local level.45 Such problems can create frustration for donors anxious to get 
things done and achieve their goals within project timescales. As Christian Bueger notes, 
these problems can also lead to the distrust of local actors, who can under these 
circumstances come to be perceived by internationals as feckless, disorganised or often 




                                                        
40 Interview 14, Hargeisa, 28 November 2016.  
41 Interview 13, Hargeisa, 27 November 2016.  
42 Interviews 1 and 3, Hargeisa, 20 and 21 August 2016.  
43 Interview 1, Hargeisa, 21 August 2016. 
44 Interviews 2 and 5, Hargeisa, 18 and 21 August 2016. 
45 Interview 4, Hargeisa, 20 August 2016.  




Maritime capacity programmes have been welcomed by actors in the region because they at 
least aspire to address self-evident local weaknesses, and also because they bring new 
resources, both human and financial, into the often chronically under-funded institutions and 
organisations concerned. However, as the discussion above suggests, an embedded sense of 
local ownership of these programmes – of their goals, implementation and impact – is largely 
absent. At a minimum, local actors perceive these activities as serving a narrower purpose 
than that conceived of by many donors. Indeed, almost without exception, local respondents 
understood such activities in terms of basic skills development and equipment and 
infrastructure provision, with little to no engagement with their wider goals of conflict 
prevention, peacebuilding and development.46  
 
More broadly, there is little connection between these activities and the wider societies of 
the countries in which they take place. The vast majority of people in the states concerned 
are unaware of either the capacity building activities that have occurred in this area, or indeed 
the maritime problem space as a whole. In one sense this is to be expected, and mirrors 
experience in most donor states themselves. Maritime capacity building is a rather technical 
and specialised activity that in any society is likely to be of interest only to professionals and 
enthusiasts. However, it does mean that what local legitimacy there is, is conferred by a thin 
layer of local elites, who view capacity building as a way of empowering their personal, 
institutional or political positions in a context of local competition for scarce resources.47 
There are some exceptions to this absence, in that large, very visible infrastructure projects 
that make a tangible contribution to the local economy and environment – such as the Turkish 
renovation of the Port of Mogadishu, for example – can have wider purchase and support. 
However, the lack of transparency surrounding such initiatives, and questions over how the 
benefits of such investments are shared, point to further problems relating to an absence of 
popular legitimacy and ownership.  
 
Accordingly, it might be said maritime capacity building programmes in the region have a 
‘thin’ legitimacy – in the sense that they have been broadly accepted and often welcomed by 
a small section of elite local actors, even if they are not always seen to be successful in 
practice, nor particularly cognisant of local needs. However, it is also clear that such initiatives 
have yet to be fully internalised and adopted by local actors on their own terms, and have 
little purchase in wider society. In most cases, locals do not decide what programmes are 
needed and why, and they have little to no role in driving their implementation and 
assessment. In this way, and to date at least, such activities lack the ‘thick’ legitimacy – in the 
sense of the capacity building agenda being accepted and understood in its holistic entirety – 
that would make them self-sustaining and enduringly effective over time in the absence of 
external tutelage, funding and direction.48 
 
 
                                                        
46 Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, Hargeisa, 18, 20 and 21 August 2016.  
47 I am grateful to Filip Ejdus for this point.  
48 This conceptualisation of thick and thin legitimacy is draws on Walzer 1994 and related literatures. See 
Gilley 2007 for a review.  




Maritime capacity building in the States of Somalia remains a relatively recent activity, with 
few initiatives dating back more than five or six years. In this time, it has undoubtedly had a 
positive impact in some areas. There is a more developed coastguard and port infrastructure 
in Somalia now than at any time since the early 1990s, for example, and this is, in part at least, 
a consequence of the efforts of the donor community. Similarly, judicial mechanisms and 
penal infrastructure for dealing with piracy suspects have strengthened across the region. 
However, the success of these activities has been narrow and uneven. They have been able 
to strengthen pockets of capacity in specific organisations and institutions, but they have 
done so in a manner that has not always been well coordinated with other donor activities or 
local priorities, and in an environment of wider political, economic and institutional 
weaknesses that have constrained their impact and on which they have been dependent. 
Given the scale of the challenge, the transnational and regionally situated nature of the 
maritime problem space, and the timescales over which such activities have taken place, it is 
perhaps not surprising that they have struggled to be transformative in nature. Even so, the 
extent to which they have taken place in the absence of local involvement at the levels of 
problem identification, and project development and evaluation is also notable. This deficit 
has led to a ‘thin’ rather than ‘thick’ legitimacy amongst local actors, and has exacerbated 
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